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BASEL III: THE BANKING BAND-AID? 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel 
Committee), for the third time, attempted to alter the failures of Basel II that 
were exposed during the 2007–2009 financial crisis in order to prevent 
future economic downturns.1 Although their efforts will assist in curbing 
risks, previously realized under weaker bank capital requirements, the new 
measures are insufficient. Rather than fixing the flawed method of risk 
valuation, the Basel Committee simply made adjustments to its existing 
rules framework. In other words, the Basel Committee has merely reached 
into its past, strengthened the Basel II capital requirements, and relabeled 
the regulations. 
The global banking community is currently undertaking an attempt to 
overhaul international banking regulations.2 The new round of regulations, 
known as Basel III, continues the efforts of Basel II, focusing on improving 
the health of the global banking industry and fostering greater consistency 
across the world.3  
Basel is a set of banking regulations created by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), a group of representatives from the G20 
countries. To date, there have been three adaptations of the Basel 
regulations, referred to as Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III. Basel I responded 
to “the increasingly more common cross-border capital flows and the 
resulting integration of financial markets that had been going on for some 
time, requir[ing] a new global regulatory framework which would help 
ensure the stability of the international financial system.”4 Each set of Basel 
regulations has focused on increasing bank capital in proportion to credit 
risk, through the use of risk weights5—a tool that analyzes the capital 
adequacy of a bank.6 The capital requirements imposed on banks by Basel I, 
however, were rather relaxed. This relaxed approach led to more risk 
                                                                                                                 
 1. WALTER W. EUBANKS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41467, THE STATUS OF THE BASEL III 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY ACCORD 1 (2010). 
 2. See Nick Louth, Will Basel III Change the Banks?, MSN MONEY (Sept. 15, 2010, 4:41 
PM), http://money.uk.msn.com/investing/articles.aspx?cp-documentid=154680405. 
 3. See Progress Report on Basel III Implementation, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 1 (Oct. 
2011), http://www.bis.org/bcbs203.pdf; see generally History of the Basel Committee and Its 
Membership, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2012) [hereinafter BIS Memorandum].  
 4. Juliusz Jablecki, The Impact of Basel I Capital Requirements on Bank Behavior and the 
Efficacy of Monetary Policy, 2 INT’L J. OF ECON SCI. & APPLIED RES. 16, 16 n.1 (2009). 
 5. Risk-Weighted Asset Definition, INVESTORWORDS, http://www.investorwords.com/6653 
/risk_weighted_asset.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2012). A risk-weighted asset is “[a] bank’s assets 
weighted according to credit risk. Some assets, such as debentures, are assigned a higher risk than 
others, such as cash. This sort of asset calculation is used in determining the capital requirement 
for a financial institution, and is regulated by the Federal Reserve Board.” Id.; see also Risk-
Weighted Assets Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r 
/riskweightedassets.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Risk-Weighted Assets Definition]. 
 6. Jablecki, supra note 4, at 18. 
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arbitrage7 and increased the instability of banking institutions around the 
globe.8 
In response, Basel II overhauled many of the loopholes in Basel I, 
taking a more careful approach to risk weights. Basel II “expand[ed] the 
scope, technicality, and depth of the original Basel Accord.”9 Basel II 
created stronger capital requirements through the implementation of a 
standardized approach to evaluating credit risk.10 This approach involves 
credit rating agencies (CRA) in the risk analysis process.11 Basel II also 
introduced the Advanced Internal Rating Based (AIRB) approach, which is 
conducted by the banks themselves.12 The standardized approach, in 
conjunction with the AIRB approach, served to increase the supervision 
lacking in Basel I. This framework was supposed to make the system safer 
across the globe but largely failed.13 
Basel III is aimed at remedying this failure and preventing another 
financial crisis. Although it purports to remedy the flaws of Basel I and II, it 
does not go far enough to avert a future crisis. This is particularly true with 
respect to the continued practice of assigning risk weights through the 
standardized and AIRB approach.14 The new capital requirements devote a 
larger portion of bank capital to common equity15 and Tier 1 capital,16 
                                                                                                                 
 7. “[A]ttempting to profit by exploiting price differences of identical or similar financial 
instruments, on different markets or in different forms.” Arbitrage Definition, INVESTORWORDS, 
http://www.investorwords.com/245/arbitrage.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2012). 
 8. Jablecki, supra note 4, at 16.  
 9. See Bryan J. Balin, Basel I, Basel II, and Emerging Markets: A Nontechnical Analysis 6 
(John Hopkins Univ. Sch. of Advanced Int’l Studies (SAIS), Working Paper, May 2008). 
 10. See W. Ronald Gard, George Bailey in the Twenty-First Century: Are We Moving to the 
Postmodern Era in International Financial Regulation with Basel II?, 8 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. 
OF BUS. L. 161, 164 (2006). 
 11. Balin, supra note 9, at 7.  
 12. Id. at 6–7.  
 13. See L. Jacabo Rodriguez, Banking Stability and the Basel Capital Standards, 23 CATO J. 
115, 119 (2003) (“The original Basel Accord (Basel I) was the wrong response to a real 
problem—the conflict between deposit insurance systems and the national regulation of capital 
standards—and, most likely, has made the global financial system less, not more, stable.”). 
 14. Simon Johnson, Top Finance Experts To G20: The Basel III Process is a Disaster, THE 
BASEL SCENARIO (Nov. 11, 2010), http://baselinescenario.com/2010/11/11/top-finance-experts 
-to-g20-the-basel-iii-process-is-a-disaster/. Johnson discusses an article by Anat Admati, Professor 
at Stanford University, which finds that Basel risk weights are not working:  
[T]he Basel process uses dysfunctional methods to adjust capital requirements to reflect 
the risk of various kinds of assets.  
“The Basel accords determine required equity levels through a system of risk weights, . 
. . . This system encourages ‘innovations’ to economize on equity, which undermine 
capital regulation and often add to systemic risk. The proliferation of synthetic AAA 
securities [around U.S. housing loans] before the crisis is an example.”  
Id. (quoting Professor Anat Admati) (alteration in the original). 
 15. Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision (Sept. 12, 
2010) [hereinafter BIS Press Release], available at http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf. 
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which forces the bank to hold more capital on its balance sheet.17 Common 
equity is defined as “[a] measure of equity which only takes into account 
the common stockholders, and disregards the preferred stockholders. It is 
equal to shareholders’ equity minus preferred equity.”18 Tier 1 capital under 
the new system is “[a] term used to describe the capital adequacy of a bank. 
Tier I capital is core capital.”19 
The risk-weighted asset (RWA)20 framework of Basel III conditions the 
amount of common equity and Tier 1 capital a bank must hold on the risks 
associated with particular assets.21 For example, “loans that are secured by a 
letter of credit would be weighted riskier than a mortgage loan that is 
secured with collateral”22 and thus the loan secured by letter of credit would 
require a bank to hold more capital. The increase in capital requirements 
will alter the types of assets held and activities undertaken (such as issuing 
more common stock to raise capital) by banks.23  
The use of RWA in capital measurements set forth in Basel II is, for the 
most part, maintained under Basel III.24 Furthermore, banks, using internal 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Tier 1 Capital Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t 
/tier1capital.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2010).  
 17. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: 
The Impact of the Basle Accord 15 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 1, 1999) 
[hereinafter Capital Requirements and Bank Behavior] (“[D]epending on the ratio concerned 
(leverage ratio, Tier 1 to Risk-weighted Assets (RWA) or total capital to RWA), the numerator 
may be changed by retaining earnings, issuing equity or issuing other quasi-equity securities such 
as subordinated debt. Similarly, the denominator may be adjusted by cutting back loans or, in the 
case of ratios to RWA, by shifting into assets that bear a relatively low risk weight such as 
residential mortgages, short-term interbank exposures or government securities.”). 
 18. Common Equity Definition, INVESTORWORDS, http://www.investorwords.com/6762 
/common_equity.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
 19. Tier 1 Capital Definition, supra note 16; see Balin, supra note 9, at 3.  
 20. Risk-Weighted Assets Definition, supra note 5. Risk-weighted assets are defined “[i]n 
terms of the minimum amount of capital that is required within banks and other institutions, based 
on a percentage of the assets, weighted by risk.” Id.  
 21. Risk-Weighted Assets Definition, supra note 5. 
 22. Id.  
 23. See Katharina Bart, Swiss Banks Confident on Basel Reforms, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 13, 
2010, 1:08 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052748704483004575523 
141112159212-lMyQjAxMTAwMDIwNzEyNDcyWj.html; Elena Logutenkova & Klaus Wille, 
UBS, Credit Suisse May Need to Boost Capital to 19%, BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 4, 2010, 11:44AM), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-04/ubs-credit-suisse-may-need-to-boost-capital-to 
-19-.html. Both articles discuss the crossroads many banks are finding themselves at: how to raise 
enough capital to meet Basel III requirements, or, how to remove enough of the riskier capital the 
bank holds to meet the Basel III requirements. In either scenario, the bank activities (lending, asset 
purchases, etc.) will need to be reevaluated to ensure the capital ratios are followed. 
 24. Douglas J. Elliot, Basel III, the Banks, and the Economy, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, 8 
(July 23, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0726_basel_elliott.aspx (stating that 
changes to Basel III will include higher capital ratios, which will be made more difficult for a 
bank to achieve, with higher risk weight values assigned to various asset classes, and 
countercyclical capital requirement of 2.5 percent that will be added on top of the 8 percent 
minimum total capital requirement). 
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risk based models,25 create their own risk weights, which further 
complicates these measurements with regard to how the values are 
decided.26 Much of the uncertainty concerning RWA measurements stems 
from the relative risk assigned to a particular asset class.27 With credit rating 
agencies28 valuing asset class risk levels (as they had under Basel II), the 
system runs into valuation issues. For example, during the financial crisis, 
many of the assets rated AAA,29 such as mortgage backed securities,30 were 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Id. (explaining that internal risk models are retained in the Basel III framework and how 
they are intertwined with the RWA approach). Banks can therefore assign risk levels to their 
assets that affect capital ratios and benefit the bank’s leverage capabilities if the risk assigned were 
to be undervalued. See Jablecki, supra note 4, at 31 (“Most importantly, Basel II imposes a much 
more sensitive set of risk weights which are meant not only to eliminate capital arbitrage 
techniques, such as securitization, prevalent most notably in the U.S., but also ensure that riskier 
banks hold more equity. One interesting novelty is that under the new framework, banks’ capital 
requirements are based on their internal estimates of the probabilities of default (PDs) and losses 
given default (LGDs) of their loans. Clearly, PDs and LGDs are highly pro-cyclical, i.e. the 
creditworthiness of borrowers moves with the economic cycle, and thus more capital will have to 
be set aside during a depression and less during an economic boom. In other words, when interest 
rates increase due to a monetary policy tightening, PDs and LGDs are likely to rise as well, and 
hence lead to higher capital requirements, which in turn, on both accounts mentioned before, 
might reduce bank lending. Thus, the tentative conclusion regarding Basel II is that it strengthens 
the bank lending channel.”). 
 26. Elliot, supra note 24, at 8.  
 27. See FDIC Law, Regulations, Related Acts, 12 C.F.R. § 325, App’x A (2011) (discussing 
the FDIC model for assigning risk weights). 
 28. Credit Rating Agencies Definition, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://financial-dictionary 
.thefreedictionary.com/Credit+Rating+Agencies (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). A credit rating 
agency is defined as  
[a] company that provides investors with assessments of an investment’s risk. The 
issuers of investments, especially debt securities, pay credit rating agencies to provide 
them with ratings. A high rating indicates low risk and may therefore encourage 
investors to buy a security. Additionally, banks may only invest in securities with a 
high rating from two or more credit rating agencies. The SEC recognizes 10 firms as 
credit rating agencies; Fitch, S&P, and Moody’s are the three most prominent. 
However, the methods of credit ratings agencies have been subject to criticism. For 
example, most agencies gave high-risk mortgage-backed securities top ratings until 
they defaulted at the collapse of the housing bubble.  
Id. See also Richard Smith, Basel III vs. Dodd-Frank on Ratings Agencies and Risk Weights, 
NAKED CAPITALISM (Sept. 23, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/09/basel-
iii-vs-dodd-frank-on-ratings-agencies-and-risk-weights.html (discussing the negative impact that 
credit rating agencies had during the financial meltdown and their problematic and continued role 
in the Basel III framework). The Dodd-Frank Act has still not come to a conclusion as to what role 
credit rating agencies will play under the new financial regulations. Id.  
 29. AAA Rating Scale, Bond and Long Term Debt Rating Scale, CREDIT GURU, 
http://www.creditguru.com/bondRating.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2010) (“Bonds rated AAA are of 
the highest credit quality, with exceptionally strong protection for the timely repayment of 
principal and interest. Earnings are considered stable, the structure of the industry in which the 
entity operates is strong, and the outlook for future profitability is favourable.”). 
 30. Mortgage-Backed Securities, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm 
(last updated July 23, 2010) [hereinafter Mortgage-backed Securities] (“Mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) are debt obligations that represent claims to the cash flows from pools of 
mortgage loans, most commonly on residential property. Mortgage loans are purchased from 
banks, mortgage companies, and other originators and then assembled into pools by a 
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not in fact low-risk to no-risk assets. Basel III leaves this framework in 
place and thus does not sufficiently curb risk. 
To effectively curb risk, risk weights attached to assets such as 
sovereign debt, which is currently considered to present 0 percent risk, 
should be increased by a disinterested party with the authority to advise 
(similar to the BIS, which has no binding authority on member nations), 
with no asset class receiving a 0 percent risk weight. This will improve the 
stability of banking institutions as they strive to increase profits for their 
shareholders and those who use their banks as savings and loan 
institutions.31 In addition to this safeguard, BIS should implement a more 
dynamic approach to risk evaluation. This note will propose a different 
standardized approach. This approach will embrace the valuation of risk by 
a neutral body and attempt to deemphasize the reliance on the AIRB 
approach. 
Part I of this note discusses the provisions of Basel II and Basel III and 
the primary differences between Basel II and Basel III. Part II describes the 
anticipated effects of Basel III’s RWA provisions. Part III argues that 
RWAs are at the core of Basel III’s failure to curb risk and the new 
regulations do not depart enough from the Basel II framework because 
banks will use the AIRB approach to decide their own RWAs going 
forward. Part IV offers an alternative to assigning risk weights that will 
prevent the under-estimation of risk that caused the recent financial crisis.  
I. THE BASEL CONFERENCE: A BANKER’S BALL IN 
SWITZERLAND 
Four times a year, a committee of international bankers gathers to 
deliberate over the status of the international banking community.32 The 
committee is comprised of representatives from the G20 countries. Since its 
inception, the group has expanded to include twenty-seven members.33 With 
its headquarters in the small Swiss town of Basel,34 the Basel Committee 
                                                                                                                 
governmental, quasi-governmental, or private entity. The entity then issues securities that 
represent claims on the principal and interest payments made by borrowers on the loans in the 
pool, a process known as securitization.”). 
 31. See Felix Salmon, The Biggest Weakness of Basel III, REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2010), http: 
//blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/09/15/the-biggest-weakness-of-basel-iii/. 
 32. BIS Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1.  
 33. Id. (including: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, 
Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States).  
 34. Id. (noting two other offices exist in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China and in Mexico City).  
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was established in the mid-1970s in response to problems with currency 
deficiencies and banking markets.35 
Most recently, on September 12, 2010, the group issued statements that 
Basel III would increase capital requirements.36 This solution appears to be 
a logical response to the global financial crises and the resultant U.S. 
government bailout37 of failing banks.38 By requiring higher quality capital 
reserves to appear on bank balance sheets,39 future economic downturns 
will not ruin the banking sector.40 Although these new capital requirements 
better address risk management by banks, Basel III fails to address the 
methodology of risk valuation.41 It permits banks to continue using the 
AIRB approach in the valuation of assets and risk weights.42 This allows the 
largest banks to internally control the RWA framework and encourages 
banks to maintain the rules to remain profitable. Such an outcome is in 
conflict with the goals of the Basel Committee. 
The goal of the Basel Committee is to “provide[] a forum for regular 
cooperation between its member countries on banking supervisory 
matters.”43 The original intention behind the Basel Conference was to 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. (explaining the original international currency crisis involved Germany and their 
banking sectors currency control problems, which were jointly addressed by the original ten 
nations that belonged to the Basel committee).  
 36. Natsuko Waki & Catherine Bosley, Global Regulators Agree on Tougher Basel III Bank 
Rules, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2010, 7:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68B16L 
20100912 (discussing Europe’s reaction to the new rules imposed by Basel III). European 
arguments for and against Basel III are important to consider when analyzing the framework’s 
impact in the United States. Id.  
 37. See History of U.S. Government Bailouts, PRO PUBLICA, http://www.propublica.org 
/special/government-bailouts (Apr. 15, 2009, 12:02 PM) (discussing a history of government 
bailouts dating back to Penn Central’s bankruptcy filing and the subsequent bailout of the banking 
sector). “In October 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which 
authorized the Treasury Department to spend $700 billion to combat the financial crisis. Treasury 
has been doling out the money via an alphabet soup of different programs.” Id. 
 38. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR 2 (Dec. 
2009) [hereinafter BIS CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT] (on file with author) (explaining that a safer 
banking structure with more predictability in times of crisis will lead to a less harsh result for the 
broader economy). 
 39. BIS Press Release, supra note 15 (stating that high quality capital reserves are known as 
Tier 1 capital, and are considered the safest and most essential to a banks daily practices such as 
lending and trading activities). 
 40. BIS CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 38, at 1–2 (explaining that most recently, 
banks did not have enough core capital to respond to the economic downturn that was created by 
the home mortgage markets, so government bailouts infused capital to save the banks).  
 41. Felix Salmon, The Good and the Bad of Basel III, SEEKING ALPHA (July 27, 2010), 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/212051-the-good-and-the-bad-of-basel-iii.  
 42. Elliot, supra note 24, at 4–8.  
 43. BIS Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1. The Basel Conferences involve all member nations, 
and different nations have different representatives present at the Conferences. For example, the 
United States sends the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision. Id.  
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streamline the supervisory process in the international banking 
community.44 Basel supervises the banking industry “by exchanging 
information on national supervisory arrangements; by improving the 
effectiveness of techniques for supervising international banking business; 
and by setting minimum supervisory standards in areas where they are 
considered desirable.”45  
The standards promulgated by Basel are not binding on member 
nations.46 Rather, the member nations may adopt the suggested and agreed 
upon requirements that are negotiated throughout the Basel Conferences.47 
For example, in the United States, only the ten largest banks were subject to 
adhere to Basel II, while all other smaller banks were governed by Basel I 
and other U.S. banking regulations.48  
Major focal points of the committee are capital requirements and the 
supervisory roles that governing bodies play in the enforcement of capital 
requirements.49 Due to the globalization of the banking sector,50 the Basel 
Committee has aimed its reforms at a globalized effort for the accounting of 
various risks that banks take on their balance sheets.51 The Financial Risk 
Institute52 explains the importance of the RWA schema: “(i) it provides a 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. (noting that a major debate over the most recent Basel requirements involved the time 
frame for implementation, which will be fully in effect by 2019, with some other changes being 
required for compliance with the Basel regime as early as 2013).  
 47. EUBANKS, supra note 5, at 1 (discussing the weight that Basel has on member nations by 
noting that twenty-seven of the largest world economies all influence the banking rules, which 
members are expected to adopt domestically). 
 48. Id. (providing an example of how the regulations stemming from Basel II are not binding 
without further domestic rulemaking).  
 49. BIS Memorandum, supra note 3, at 3.  
 50. See generally BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., GLOBAL CORPORATE BANKING 2010: CRISIS 
AS OPPORTUNITY (2010), available at http://www.bcg.com/documents/file50789.pdf (discussing 
the trend known as “Globalization 2.0”). The report explains how crisis in the banking industry 
will lead to the creation of “blue chip” bank opportunities, encouraging banks to go into emerging 
markets and find opportunities to expand business and find new clients abroad; due to 
“megatrends” in the global banking industry, such as tech development, globalization will most 
likely continue to emerge as a source of competitive advantage. Id.  
 51. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, International Regulatory Framework for Banks 
(Basel III), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter 
International Regulatory Framework] (“The reforms target: . . .macroprudential, system wide 
risks that can build up across the banking sector as well as the procyclical amplification of these 
risks over time.”). The accepted idea is international cooperation in the banking sector will lead to 
safe investments in all markets. Id. See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2010 rev. Jun. 2011) [hereinafter BASEL 
COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
 52. About the Institute, THE FIN. RISK INST., http://riskinstitute.ch/about.htm (last visited Apr. 
9, 2012) (“IFCI Foundation – International Financial Risk Institute was established as a not-for-
profit foundation under the supervision of the Swiss Federal Authorities in 1984. . . . The new 
objective of the Financial Risk Institute is to promote a ‘learning environment’ on issues relevant 
to financial risk management.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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fairer basis for making international comparisons between banking systems 
whose structures may differ; (ii) it allows off-balance-sheet exposures to be 
incorporated more easily into the measure; and (iii) it does not deter banks 
from holding liquid or other assets which carry low risk.”53 
A. THE REVISED SYSTEM: HOW BASEL III WILL ADDRESS THE 
SHORTCOMINGS OF BASEL II 
In light of the economic crisis, the Basel Committee realized that 
changes were necessary to help restore confidence in the global banking 
system.54 Three key components of the Basel III framework are: (1) capital 
requirements, (2) RWA calculations, and (3) the continued use of AIRB 
modeling as a primary source of measuring a bank’s exposure to risk.55 
These three areas are intertwined, with a major area of concern involving 
risk weights and how they remain an area of uncertainty due to the 
continued support of the advanced internal risk modeling under the Basel 
III framework, which allows banks to determine the relative risk weights 
for their own assets.56 Uncertainty still exists due to the current degree of 
bank discretion that exists without clear guidelines to supervise the AIRB 
calculations.57 
1. Capital Requirements 
There are two notable changes to the Basel III capital requirements: an 
increase in the percentage of common equity a bank must retain in relation 
to its RWA, and an increase in the Tier 1 capital ratios. First, capital 
requirements58 will increase from the 2-percent common equity59 
                                                                                                                 
 53. International Convergence on Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: Part II: The 
Risk Weights, COMM. AT THE BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENT (Apr. 1988), http://www.riskinstitute 
.ch/CapAcCapital.htm.  
 54. Basel III: What the Experts Say, GUARDIAN.UK.COM, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business 
/2010/sep/13/basel-iii-what-the-experts-say (last visited Nov. 20, 2010) (discussing how Basel III 
influenced markets across the globe to increase capital, and many banks view the rules as not as 
strict as many had expected). 
 55. See International Regulatory Framework, supra note 51; BASEL COMMITTEE REPORT, 
supra note 51, at 39; Capital Requirements and Bank Behavior, supra note 17, at 6, 15–16.  
 56. See DOUGLAS J. ELLIOT, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, A PRIMER ON BANK CAPITAL 9 
(2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/~/media/A84D1C57A7CE4539BCD 
0FE6F66D1FB63.pdf [hereinafter A PRIMER ON BANK CAPITAL] (discussing why RWAs are an 
important aspect of the global banking streamlining process).  
 57. Vanessa Le Leslé & Sofiya Avramova, Revisiting Risk-Weighted Assets: “Why Do RWAs 
Differ Across Countries and What Can Be Done About It?” 21 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp1290.pdf (describing 
the four major components within the internal ratings based formula, including: probability of 
default (PD), Loss Given Default (LGD), Maturity (M), and risk-weight (RW)). 
 58. Douglas B. Elliot defines capital requirements as “the portion of a bank’s assets which 
have no associated contractual commitment for repayment. It is, therefore, available as a cushion 
in case the value of the bank’s assets declines or its liabilities rise.” A PRIMER ON BANK CAPITAL, 
supra note 56, at 1. 
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requirement under Basel II to 3.5 percent retained in common equity.60 
Common equity is important to a bank because, “as we understand it, [it] is 
the first line of capital to take losses.”61 In hindsight, many in the banking 
sector agree that the former capital requirements were set too low to 
respond to a global financial meltdown.62 Thus, the new common equity 
level puts banks on alert that more money must remain available to respond 
to financial stress in case loan and asset values decline.63 The Tier 1 capital 
requirement will also be increased from 4 to 6 percent by January 1, 2015.64 
These changes were a direct response to a “run on the banks” issue 
experienced during the economic downturn.65 The anticipated effects of 
increasing capital requirements will be to force banks to raise more capital 
through equity offerings,66 decrease their participation in riskier, higher 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Tracy Alloway, Tangled Tangibles, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2008, 14:42 PM), http: 
//ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2008/11/21/18538/tangled-tangibles/. Common equity is defined as  
‘tangible common equity,’ which is common equity minus the value of ‘intangible 
assets.’ Common equity is the total accounting (“book”) value of assets minus the value 
of liabilities (everything that the company owes) minus the value of any form of equity 
other than common stock, usually consisting only of preferred stock. That is, it 
represents the value of the assets minus everything that someone else has a claim on. 
DOUGLAS B. ELLIOT, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, BANK CAPITAL AND THE STRESS TESTS 9 
(2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0303_bank_capital 
_elliott/0303_bank_capital_elliott.pdf. 
 60. See BASEL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 51, at 69 (stating that the capital ratio of 4.5 
percent is calculated by taking common equity divided by risk-weighted assets).  
 61. Alloway, supra note 59. 
 62. Kerry Curry, Higher Capital Requirements Needed on ABS, Federal Reserve Governor 
Says, HOUSING WIRE (Nov. 24, 2010, 10:29 AM), http://www.housingwire.com/2010/11/12 
/higher-capital-requirements-needed-on-abs-federal-reserve-governor-says-2 (“It was also 
apparent that at least some of the instruments that qualified as Tier 1 capital for regulatory 
purposes were not reliable buffers against losses, at least not on a going-concern basis . . . .” 
(quoting Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo)).  
 63. See YCHARTS PRO INVESTOR SERVICE, Bank Capital: Tangible Common Equity vs. 
Wishful Thinking Ratios, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2012, 9:35 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites 
/ycharts/2012/03/10/bank-capital-tangible-common-equity-vs-wishful-thinking-ratios/print/.  
 64. BIS Press Release, supra note 15, at Annex 1. See also Elliot, supra note 24, at 3. BIS 
explains the rationale for the increase, stating that “[i]f bank balance sheets were always accurate 
and banks always made profits, there would be no need for capital. Unfortunately, we do not live 
in that utopia, so a cushion of capital is necessary.” Id. 
 65. BASEL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 51, at 1–2.  
 66. Radio Interview by Renee Montagne with David Wessel, Economics Editor, Wall St. J., 
(May 8, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103926731. 
David Wessel, Economics Editor of the Wall Street Journal, discussed the need, during the 
financial crisis, for banks to raise capital, and provided several examples: 
Bank of America, like any bank, has a couple of choices now. If they can, they’ll go out 
and raise equity by selling shares. Wells Fargo and Morgan Stanley said yesterday 
they’re going to do that. They can sell off businesses, and then they take the money and 
put that into their capital cushion. They can do this conversion of preferred stock, either 
preferred held by private investors or by the government already, and convert that. 
Id. 
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yielding investments,67 or merge with other banks.68 Holding more capital 
aside takes money away from bank operations aimed at increasing profits,69 
an issue many global banks have recently spoke out about in the European 
banking community.70 This could decrease profits and decrease the number 
of banks in the sector.71 None of these drastic results will occur in the near 
future,72 however, because these rules will not be fully in effect until 
2019.73 
Under Basel II, the remainder of capital requirements could be made up 
of Tier 2 capital.74 This meant a bank could keep less liquid75 and riskier 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Bart, supra note 23 (discussing how UBS will have to alter their capital ratios in order to 
comply with the Basel ratio and maintain their ability to pay out dividends to shareholders); 
Logutenkova & Wille, supra note 23 (discussing how the Swiss government will almost double 
the capital requirements of Basel III by 2019, severely altering the asset holdings of both UBS and 
Credit Suisse).  
 68. Joe Ortiz, Blue Skies For Banks? M&A Could Follow, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2010, 10:41 
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/source/2010/09/01/blue-skies-smiling-at-banks-ma-could-follow/ 
(discussing how banks that are well capitalized may look for opportunities to buy smaller banks in 
order to better position themselves for the future Basel III framework). 
 69. Simon Johnson & James Kwak, Capital Requirements Are Not Enough, THE BASELINE 
SCENARIO (Apr. 1, 2010), http://baselinescenario.com/2010/04/01/capital-requirements-are-not 
-enough/ (“The more capital, however, the lower the institution’s leverage, and hence the lower its 
profits per dollar of capital invested—which is why banks always want lower capital 
requirements.”). 
 70. Bart, supra note 23; Logutenkova & Wille, supra note 23.  
 71. Ortiz, supra note 68. Ortiz describes the initial fears that Basel III would freeze lending 
and harm profits in the sector:  
Consequently, the scare stories of earlier this year from people such as the Institute of 
International Finance that claimed the new regulations would hurt bank profits and their 
ability to help the economic recovery seem to have been consigned to the garbage. The 
banks won. Under “blue-sky,” Credit Suisse now sees bank returns reaching 17% by 
end-2012 compared with its current 14% forecast. 
Id. 
 72. Suzanne McGee, Wall Street’s Still on the Road to Risk, PORTFOLIO.COM (Sept. 17, 2010), 
http://www.portfolio.com/industry-news/banking-finance/2010/09/17/wall-street-is-bound-to 
-repeat-mistakes-even-after-dodd-frank-financial-reform (discussing how Dodd-Frank and Basel 
III have increased the banking sector’s stability). Risk taking, as it existed prior to the financial 
crisis, will still be prevalent across the system as banks fight to squeeze out profits while dealing 
with increased capital restraints. Id.  
 73. BIS Press Release, supra note 15, at 7.  
 74. Id., at 3 (“The difference between the total capital requirement of 8.0% and the Tier 1 
requirement can be met with Tier 2 and higher forms of capital.”); Tier 2 capital, MONEY TERMS, 
http://moneyterms.co.uk/tier-2/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2012) (“Tier 2 capital is used to calculate the 
tier 2 capital adequacy ratio, a broader measure than the tier 1 ratio. Tier 2 capital is tier 1 capital 
plus subordinated debt and some less certain assets such as revaluation reserves. The tier 2 ratio is 
much the same as the tier 1 ratio: tier 2 capital ÷ risk weighted assets. Tier 2 capital is divided into 
lower and upper tiers. The upper tier consists of undated subordinated debt on which the bank can 
defer interest payments, essentially identical to cumulative prefs which would also fall into this 
tier. The upper tier also includes revaluation reserves. General provisions would also fall into this 
category, but as IFRS only allow specific provisions this is no longer relevant. Other subordinated 
debt is classified as lower tier 2 capital [sic] The tier 2 capital ratio is the most relevant measure 
for depositors, counter-parties and other holders of banks’ debt other than the subordinated debt. It 
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assets on their balance sheets as part of their core capital calculations.76 
Added to the Basel III requirements will be a new aspect of bank capital 
deemed the “capital conservation buffer”77 of 2.5 percent in addition to the 
4.5 percent initial common equity requirement, bringing the total common 
equity requirement to 7 percent. The total capital requirement of 8 percent 
remains unchanged.78 What has changed is the increased percentage of Tier 
1 capital required by the new rules.79 As a result, 6 percent must be Tier 1 
capital by January 1, 2015,80 while Tier 2 or other forms of low risk capital 
can fill in the additional 2 percent.81  
Finally, a countercyclical buffer82 in the common equity calculation of 
0 to 2.5 percent will be factored into a bank’s capital calculations, the BIS 
explains: 
The purpose of the countercyclical buffer is to achieve the broader 
macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of 
excess aggregate credit growth. For any given country, this buffer will 
only be in effect when there is excess credit growth that is resulting in a 
system wide build up of risk. The countercyclical buffer, when in effect, 
would be introduced as an extension of the conservation buffer range.83 
                                                                                                                 
tells us what proportion of the bank’s assets could be lost with the loss entirely absorbed by 
holders of equity, hybrid and subordinated debt.”). 
 75. Liquidity Definition, MONEY TERMS, http://moneyterms.co.uk/liquidity/ (last visited Feb. 
13, 2012) (“Liquidity is the extent to which a security is easily tradeable. If a security is constantly 
trading in large quantities it is liquid. A liquid security can be sold easily and quickly, so investors 
have the assurance that if they wish to sell a holding they will be able to find a buyer at a 
reasonable price without problems. Other things being equal, the price of a liquid security is less 
volatile because, with a constant stream of purchase and sales being offered, each investor has less 
influence on the price.”).  
 76. See Tier 1 Capital Definition, supra note 16 (noting that tier 1 capital and core capital are 
often used interchangeably to describe the equity capital derived from shareholders and other 
disclosed reserve). Banks are expected to maintain a “safe” level of core capital to be able to 
absorb shocks to the financial system. Id.  
 77. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Reforms – Basel III, BASEL COMMITTEE ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 
2012). The buffer zone represents an additional layer of Tier 1 capital on top of the 4.5 percent 
requirement, which is another provision to aid in response to an economic downturn. Id. 
 78. BASEL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 51, at 28.  
 79. See id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. (“‘Tier 2’ adds in certain types of preferred stock that are less like common stock and 
more like debt, as well as certain subordinated debt securities. In addition, Tier 2 includes some 
accounting reserves that provide a protective function similar to other forms of capital.” (footnote 
omitted)); Elliot, supra note 24, at 5.  
 82. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Reforms – Basel III, BASEL COMMITTEE ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 
2012). A Countercyclical buffer is “[i]mposed within a range of 0–2.5% comprising common 
equity, when authorities judge credit growth is resulting in an unacceptable build up of systematic 
risk.” Id. 
 83. BIS Press Release, supra note 15, at 2.  
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The new capital requirement provisions reflect a more dynamic system, 
able to fluctuate in times of economic growth as well as recession.84 
Therefore, under the new requirements, banks will be holding anywhere 
from the minimum common equity expectation of 4.5 percent, with an 
additional 2.5 percent countercyclical buffer, and an increase in Tier 1 
capital, bringing the possible total up to 10.5 percent.85 
2. RWAs 
The topic of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital leads into a discussion of how that 
capital is measured using RWAs86 and how RWAs factor into calculating 
capital ratios. RWAs were part of Basel II87 in an effort to curb systemic 
risk in the banking sector through a more dynamic approach to risk 
evaluation.88 By assigning a percentage that reflects the relative risk of an 
asset, multiplying that percentage by the asset’s value, and adding the 
number across all assets, you arrive at a risk-weighted asset value. The 
range in risk percentage goes from 0 to 100 percent (in certain cases, assets 
are assigned percentages above 100 percent), from lowest risk to highest 
risk assets as defined by the committee.89 David J. Elliot provides an 
example of risk weighting is in his paper for the Brookings Institute on 
bank capital, entitled A Primer on Bank Capital: 
[R]esidential mortgage loans often have a 50% risk-weighting, so that a $1 
million mortgage would generate a risk-weighted asset of $500,000. If a 
bank were trying to hold capital equal to 10% of its RWA, then it would 
need $50,000 of capital to cover this mortgage. If instead of making a loan 
immediately, the bank made a commitment to lend in the future should the 
homeowner wish, then the $1 million commitment might be treated as 
equivalent to, say, a $750,000 loan. After applying the 50% risk-
weighting, this would produce an RWA of $375,000 and a need for capital 
of $37,500.90 
Under Basel II, the above example would provide the amount of money 
a bank was required to hold, based on the particular asset and in accordance 
with the assigned level of risk associated with that asset. Under Basel III, 
these RWA calculations are applied to a Tier 1 capital ratio, with the 
amount of Tier 1 capital placed in the numerator and the RWA calculation 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See id.  
 85. See id. at 6.  
 86. A PRIMER ON BANK CAPITAL, supra note 56, at 9–14.  
 87. Rodriguez, supra note 13, at 119 (discussing risk-weighted assets’ importance to the 
capital valuation scheme under Basel II).  
 88. See Risk-Weighted Asset Definition, supra note 5 (explaining the flexibility of risk-weight 
assets). 
 89. A PRIMER ON BANK CAPITAL, supra note 56, at 9–10 (noting that there has been much 
discussion over what assets receive what percentage and whether or not any assets should receive 
a 0 percent risk weight). 
 90. Id. at 10. 
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in the denominator, arriving at a percentage number that is assigned one of 
five ratings relating to the capitalization of a bank.91 The five different 
ratings that may be given to Tier 1 capital ratios are: well-capitalized, 
adequately-capitalized, undercapitalized, significantly-undercapitalized, and 
critically-undercapitalized.92 Under the standardized approach, CRAs93 
(such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, etc.) assign risk percentages for 
various assets the banks hold;94 however, under the AIRB approach banks 
evaluate the risk attached to their own assets.95 
3. AIRB Modeling and the Standardized Approach to Capital 
Ratios Under Basel III 
Lastly, it is important to note that the Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 
measurements and the risk-weight assessments used by banks to ensure 
their capital structure is in line with Basel III are also created by the 
banks.96 Two accepted practices used in Basel II are known as the 
“standardized approach”97 and the AIRB.98 The AIRB approach continues 
to be the favored method of valuing the risks of assets.99 This level of trust 
in the banking sector’s ability to accurately calculate capital asset values,100 
and in turn the risks banks were undertaking, is incongruous with a bank’s 
goal of increasing profits.101 It is this constant conflict that will eventually 
play out as Basel III is slowly phased in102 across member nations. 
Under Basel II, the theory was that global banks could create more 
sophisticated risk models103 for measuring their own risk, which would be 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Tier 1 Capital Ratio Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tier-1-
capital-ratio.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). 
 92. Id.  
 93. Smith, supra note 28.  
 94. BIS CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 38, at 6. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Elliot, supra note 24, at 5.  
 97. Id. (discussing an area of non-change between Basel II and Basel III, where banks will still 
internally manage their risk and assign valuations to their balance sheets).  
 98. Leslé & Avramova, supra note 57, at 5. 
 99. BIS Press Release, supra note 15 (discussing the Tier 1 capital requirement, which 
includes common equity and other approved financial instruments).  
 100. See Leslé & Avramova, supra note 57, at 14 (“[T]he majority of systemically important 
jurisdictions report under Basel II, with the Advanced IRB approach . . . .” (footnote omitted) 
(emphasis omitted)).  
 101. Id. at 8; see also Elliot, supra note 24, at 1 (explaining that compliance with banking 
regulation is expensive). Increases in Tier 1 capital means less bank leverage through holding 
riskier assets, which will put a strain bank profitability. Although banks claim the effects of Basel 
III will seriously harm the profitability of the banking sector, most people involved in the 
discussion agree that increasing capital is a cautious step in the right direction. Jamie Grant, De-
Leveraging Means Tight Credit Will Continue Through Year-End 2009, MIRUS CAPITAL 
ADVISORS, http://www.merger.com/admin/research/uploads/MCA%2009%2035Viewpoint-528a 
.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2012). 
 102. BIS Press Release, supra note 15, at 69.  
 103. Elliot, supra note 24, at 5; Leslé & Avramova, supra note 57, at 21 (“By design, the A-
IRB formula is complex and leaves ample room for interpretation.” (emphasis omitted)).  
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far more complex and accurate than risk analysis imposed by a third party 
in the standardized approach.104 Many in the banking community argue that 
although private institutions can expend far more resources in achieving 
complex risk analysis and that self-interest will steer banks in the right 
direction, the system remains flawed.105 As Basel III develops, however, 
opposition to the internal risk modeling theory increases, with some stating 
that the risk modeling must be modified.106  
Basel III maintains the capital ratios of Basel II and is therefore subject 
to the same criticisms.107 One major critique of Basel is that its internal risk 
models were ineffective in the detection of exposure to the mortgage crisis, 
which involved complex securitizations of mortgages to form towers of 
collateralized debt.108 For example, at the height of their popularity, 
mortgage-backed securities held ratings from CRAs, with which banks 
agreed, of AAA at a level of 93 percent.109 The system made a clear 
miscalculation in its risk analysis, and the public paid for this mistake.110 
In response to the economic crisis, Basel III has elected to keep the 
internal risk metrics approach within the allowed calculation of risk.111 The 
2009 BIS Consultative Document, entitled Strengthening the Resilience of 
the Banking Sector, proposed a method of dealing with measuring exposure 
to credit risk: 
Credit risk: Banks should have methodologies that enable them to assess 
the credit risk involved in exposures to individual borrowers or 
counterparties as well as at the portfolio level. Banks should also assess 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Leslé & Avramova, supra note 61, at 33–34 (discussing Basel II and the Advanced 
Internal Ratings Based Approach that was implemented to allow larger, more sophisticated 
financial institutions to rate their risk based on internal metrics). 
 105. Elliot, supra note 24, at 8.  
 106. Id. See also Penny Crossman, Top 7 Ways Basel III Affects U.S. Banks and Their IT 
Departments, BANK SYS. & TECH. (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.banktech.com/regulation 
compliance/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=227400445 (explaining that the banks will need to alter 
their internal risk modeling). Altering the internal risk modeling could increase complexity to the 
calculation of risk because of additional provisions in Basel III that call for more sophisticated 
models, including heightened scrutiny in areas involved in the financial crisis, such as securitized 
products. Id.; Leslé & Avramova, supra note 57, at 31 (describing how enhanced supervision and 
more robust disclosure requirements as to how RWAs are decided would help investors have a 
better picture of the banks they invest in). 
 107. Banking Day Backgrounder: Basel III, BANKING DAY, http://www.bankingday.com/nl06 
_news_selected.php?act=2&selkey=10477&stream=4 (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) [hereinafter 
Banking Day Backgrounder] (giving an overview of Basel III along with positives and negatives 
of the new requirements). 
 108. Elliot, supra note 24, at 8; see also PROVITI INC., Ten Common Risk Management Failures 
and How to Avoid Them, 3 THE BULLETIN, no. 6, at 1–5 (2008) (discussing various risk 
management issues and how to avoid common risk management mistakes); Crossman, supra note 
106. 
 109. Peter Cohan, Misplaced Incentives Were the Rot at the Core of the Financial Crisis, 
BANKING DAY (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/investing/financial-crisis 
-incentives-mortgage-backed-securities/19649593/. 
 110. See id.  
 111. See Banking Day Backgrounder, supra note 107.  
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exposures, regardless of whether they are rated or unrated, and determine 
whether the risk weights applied to such exposures, under the 
Standardised Approach, are appropriate for their inherent risk. In those 
instances where a bank determines that the inherent risk of such an 
exposure, particularly if it is unrated, is significantly higher than that 
implied by the risk weight to which it is assigned, the bank should consider 
the higher degree of credit risk in the evaluation of its overall capital 
adequacy. For more sophisticated banks, the credit review assessment of 
capital adequacy, at a minimum, should cover four areas: risk rating 
systems, portfolio analysis/aggregation, securitisation/complex credit 
derivatives, and large exposures and risk concentrations.112 
The standardized approach to credit risk “increases the risk sensitivity 
of the capital framework by recognizing that different counterparties within 
the same loan category present far different risks to the financial institution 
lender.”113 This means that CRAs assign risk weights not only to asset types 
but also to types of borrowers.114 Therefore, multiple levels of ratings must 
be considered when modeling risk: asset classes, CRAs, internal bank 
models, and risk assessments of borrowers.115 
In a recent paper published by the International Monetary Fund, the 
authors debate the benefits and detriments of the calculation of RWAs in 
each framework. Among the advantages of the AIRB approach is the 
efficiency of banking institutions.116 Although the listed disadvantages of 
returning to the Standardized Approach as described under Basel II (the 
sophistication of banks, reliance on credit rating agencies, and cost) 
outweigh the advantages (simplicity and transparency), it may be worth 
revisiting the disadvantages in an effort to modify the system.117 This note 
advocates the creation of a modified standardized approach. This approach 
would address concerns such as the removal of the CRAs from the process. 
It would empower a disinterested organization to conduct a quarterly review 
of banks’ assets, assessing their relative value and risk weights in order to 
ensure asset bubbles are not being unduly influenced by the Basel regime. 
                                                                                                                 
 112. BIS CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 38, at 57 (emphasis in original) (boldface 
omitted) (stating the proposed revision for paragraph 733 of Basel II framework).  
 113. Raymond Natter, The Basel II Standardized Approach, AM. BAR ASS’N 1, http://www.apps 
.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL130000pub/newsletter/200609/natter.pdf (last visited Oct. 
30, 2010). 
 114. Id. (explaining that ratings are done on multiple levels). Still, under Basel II and 
continuing under Basel III, banks have their own internal ratings for their own risk management 
purposes, which will ultimately be used in their capital calculations. Id.  
 115. See generally Amanda J. Bahena, What Role Did Credit Rating Agencies Play in the 
Credit Crisis?, UNI. OF IOWA CTR. FOR INT’L FIN. & DEV. 5 (Mar. 2010), http://blogs.law.uiowa 
.edu/ebook/uicifd-ebook/part-5-iii-what-role-did-credit-rating-agencies-play-credit-crisis (discuss-
ing the differences between “standardized approach” and the Internal Ratings Based Approach 
(IRB) that remain a part of the Basel III regulation).  
 116. Leslé & Avramova, supra note 57, at 34–35. 
 117. Id. 
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II. DOES BASEL III CHANGE THE FAILED SYSTEM . . . OR HAS 
TOO MUCH BEEN KEPT OF THE FORMER BASEL? 
When looking at how the chosen RWA value is incorporated into the 
risk management scheme, it is important to take note of who is doing the 
risk ratings and how they are implemented. One question to consider is who 
is most qualified to assign risk weights: ratings agencies, banks, a 
government entity, or a combination of all three? 
The problem of assigning RWAs is complicated because of the favored 
method of deciding risk weight, the AIRB approach, which allows for a 
bank to assess their capital adequacy with a view dominated by profit and 
self-interest.118 This has lead to a deviation from the standardized approach. 
Changes in capital requirements that influence RWAs will have 
implications across the banking world in terms of where the next “asset 
bubble”119 is forming. RWAs are a major consideration in a bank’s own risk 
management decisions because many institutions decide to use the AIRB 
and are encouraged to lower RWAs to meet domestic regulations and “look 
attractive under their regulatory regime.”120  
Under Basel III, the Basel Committee is currently conducting a 
voluntary test for the implementation of the new capital adequacy 
regulations.121 As part of the examinations, this note urges the Basel 
Committee to attempt to revise the standardized approach to RWAs through 
a modified standardized approach.  
A. THE BALANCING ACT BETWEEN RWA AND CAPITAL  
Basel III relies heavily on increasing the capital a bank must hold on its 
balance sheet in order to ensure that banks can cover their losses in times of 
financial emergency.122 The amount of capital needed by a particular bank 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 14 (“Banks have a strong regulatory incentive to select assets that look attractive 
under their regulatory regime.”). 
 119. Kimberly Amadeo, Asset Bubble, ABOUT.COM, http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary 
/g/asset bubble.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2010) (“An asset bubble is formed when the prices of 
assets are over-inflated due to excess demand. It usually occurs when investors all flock to a 
particular asset class, such as real estate or commodities such as oil. This happened in 2005–2006 
with real estate, and in the summer of 2008 with oil prices. It is a form of inflation that is not 
always accurately captured in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). For that reason, asset bubbles can 
be aggravated by low interest rates.”). See also Claudia Assis, Emerging-Markets Bonds Raid 
Bubble Concern, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 15, 2010, 6:40 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story 
/emerging-markets-bonds-raise-bubble-concerns-2010-10-15. 
 120. Leslé & Avramova, supra note 57, at 14–15 (describing how the influence of the Basel I or 
Basel II reporting scheme within a country’s domestic regulations will influence the assets that a 
bank carries); McGee, supra note 72 (mentioning how banks lobby to remain trusted to use the 
AIRB approach despite shortfalls of internal risk management and bank business models failing to 
take precautions to avoid the financial crisis).  
 121. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PROGRESS REPORT ON BASEL III 
IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/biiiimplmoninstr.pdf.  
 122. BIS Press Release, supra note 15, at 1.  
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will depend on its capital ratio,123 calculated by dividing Tier 1 capital by 
risk-weighted assets.124 This is one way of measuring the “health”125 of a 
bank. Basel III attempts to use both the RWA capital ratio approach and a 
new leverage liquidity ratio126 in order to provide a more accurate view of 
risk.  
On Wall Street, banks are starting to comment on their current status 
related to capital adequacy and the new risk-weight ratio requirements that 
have been released under Basel III. Recently, UBS and Credit Suisse issued 
estimates of the costs attributable to compliance with the Basel III ratio 
requirements.127 This will lead to less exposure to risk for banks, and will 
cause changes in banks’ business models with regard to how they reduce 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Id. See also Basel III – Heightened Requirements May Create New Capital Pressures, 
ARNOLD & PORTER ADVISORY, 4 (Sept. 2010), http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources 
/documents/Advisory-BaselIII_Heightened_Requirements_May_Create_New_Capital_Pressures 
_092410.pdf (discussing how many U.S. banks already satisfy the capital ratios prescribed under 
Basel III). Dodd-Frank may actually impose more strict requirements domestically for U.S. banks. 
Id. 
 124. San Francisco Region Director’s College Computer-Based Training Capital, Director’s 
Corner: Key Financial Ratios, FED DEPOSIT INS. CORP., www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources 
/directors_college/sfcb/capital.pdf (last updated Aug. 3, 2005) (discussing the meaning of capital 
in evaluating the risk level of a particular bank). 
 125. See, e.g., Banking Health in the Ninth District, FED. RES. BANK OF MINN., 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/bankingresearch/bankinghealth/index.cfm 
#earningscapital (last updated Aug. 3, 2005) (discussing the various tools used to evaluate a 
bank’s health, including asset quality and concentration, earnings and capital, liquidity, and 
overall condition). 
 126. Id. 
One of the underlying features of the crisis was the build up of excessive on- and off-
balance sheet leverage in the banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive 
leverage while still showing strong risk based capital ratios. During the most severe part 
of the crisis, the banking sector was forced by the market to reduce its leverage in a 
manner that amplified downward pressure on asset prices, further exacerbating the 
positive feedback loop between losses, declines in bank capital, and contraction in 
credit availability.  
The Committee announced in 2009 its intention to introduce a leverage ratio as a 
supplemental measure to the risk-based ratio of Basel II. . . .  
The leverage ratio is intended to achieve the following objectives: 
 constrain the build-up of leverage in the banking sector, helping avoid 
destabilising deleveraging processes which can damage the broader financial 
system and the economy; and  
 reinforce the risk-based requirements with a simple, non-risk-based 
“backstop” measure based on gross exposure. 
BIS CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 38, at 60.  
 127. Jeff Horwitz, Risk Lies in the Risk-Based Capital Approach of Basel III, ASSET 
SECURITIZATION REP. (July 14, 2010), http://www.structuredfinancenews.com/news/-208477 
-1.html (“UBS analysts have estimated the plan would require global banks to raise $375 billion in 
new capital.”); Bart, supra note 23 (noting that UBS has said their strategy will be to keep more 
profits and avoid raising new capital so that the bank will not be issuing dividends or making new 
asset purchases in the near future).  
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their risk-weight asset numbers.128 In addition, adding risk to the balance 
sheets will be even more difficult due to proposed Swiss rules that will hold 
banks headquartered in Switzerland (e.g., UBS and Credit Suisse) to even 
higher capital standards than the new Basel III requirements.129 As 
mentioned above, because the Basel Accords are influential but not binding, 
their adoption depends on domestic integration of the rules into each 
country’s financial system. 
In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act130 may 
hold banks to a capital adequacy standard above the minimum required by 
Basel III.131 One major area of concern involving risk weights involves  
§ 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act.132 Section 939A was created to reevaluate 
the manner in which risk weights will be assigned by reviewing CRAs to 
determine alternatives to CRAs.133 CRAs have been the primary player in 
the standardized approach to assigning RWA values.134 Because the AIRB 
approach is only implemented by the largest banks, the standardized 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See Logutenkova & Wille, supra note 23 (discussing the ways in which banks in 
Switzerland will be selling contingent convertible bonds in order to raise upwards of 70 billion 
Swiss francs in order to meet the new relevant capital ratios).  
 129. See Bart, supra note 23 (describing how the Swiss banks fear profits are predicted to fall 
based on the rumors of heightened capital requirements above and beyond Basel III). Furthermore, 
Swiss banks are grappling with the government over a proposed total capital requirement of 19 
percent. Banks are lobbying to set the requirement at 13 percent. Elena Logutenkova, UBS Says 
Swiss Capital Rules Should Be Aligned Globally, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www 
.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-23/ubs-says-swiss-capital-rules-should-be-aligned-internationally 
.html. 
 130. Peter J. Rivas, Dodd-Frank Capital Requirements for Financial Institutions, JONES 
WALKER (Oct. 14, 2010), available at http://www.joneswalker.com/news-publications-659.html 
(“The centerpiece of the Act’s new regulatory capital requirements is Section 171, the Collins 
Amendment, which is intended to ensure that ‘financial institutions hold sufficient capital to 
absorb losses during future periods of financial distress.’ Section 171 directs federal banking 
agencies to establish minimum leverage and risk-based capital requirements on a consolidated 
basis for insured depository institutions, their holding companies and nonbank financial 
companies that have been determined to be systemically significant by the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC).” (quoting Sheila Bair to Sen. Collins) (footnote omitted)). 
 131. Ross Kerber, US Bank Rules to be Stricter Than Basel-FDIC’s Bair, REUTERS (Oct. 20, 
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2024825320101021. In her speech at Harvard 
University, Sheila Blair, head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, said, “she expects 
large U.S. banks will have to meet stricter capital requirements than specified in the new 
international rules known as Basel III.” Id. (quoting Sheila Blair). 
 132. See Barry Hester, Regulators Respond to Dodd-Frank, BRYAN CAVE (Sept. 2, 2010), 
http://www.bankbryancave.com/regulators-respond-to-dodd-frank/ (“These rules are to be 
promulgated pursuant to Section 939A of Dodd-Frank, a section which essentially eliminates 
regulatory reliance on the ‘big three’ rating agencies in developing capital standards.”). 
 133. Lisa Pollack, Read My Lips: No More Credit Ratings, ALPHAVILLE (Sept. 22, 2010), 
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/09/22/349406/read-my-lips-no-more-ratings/ (“The two major 
potential approaches that the agencies are seeking comment on from the industry are an exposure 
category approach, which applies broad risk weights by the categories that an exposure falls into, 
and an exposure specific approach where more granular metrics, such as credit spreads, can be 
used.”). 
 134. Leslé & Avramova, supra note 57, at 34, 37. 
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approach remains relevant and should be a major focus for regulators to 
revisit both in the United States and around the globe. 
Although the United States has not fully embraced Basel III, it appears 
that the United States has adopted or will agree to adopt many of the ideals 
of the Basel Accord (such as increased capital requirements); however, the 
legislature’s response to RWA may be different.135 Already, many top 
banks in the United States are predicted to fall short of the capital 
requirements, with estimates ranging from $100 billion to $150 billion.136 
Formerly, the United States opted to only subject the largest domestic banks 
to Basel II137 and allowed all other institutions to remain compliant with 
Basel I.138 
As more capital is required, the efforts to either raise that capital or 
shed assets that are assigned greater RWA values are necessary to increase 
the numerator of the ratio (capital) to comply with Basel III.139 Under the 
new rules, risk weights across asset classes remain relatively unchanged,140 
while tighter constraints141 as to what constitutes capital that can be used in 
the Tier 1 capital ratio equation142 creates a stress on banks to alter what 
asset classes143 they hold that will be risk weighted. According to Noah 
Millman, Basel III is simply a repeat of the RWA problems experienced in 
Basel II, albeit with a higher capital number required in the ratio 
                                                                                                                 
 135. U.S. Implementation of Basel III: Current Developments, MORRISON & FOERSTER, 4 
(Mar. 12, 2012) http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/120312-US-Implementation-of 
-Basel-III-Current-Developments.pdf.  
 136. Brooke Masters & Justin Baer, U.S. Banks Face $100 Billion Capital Shortfall, FIN. TIMES 
(Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/40309961 (“The top 35 US banks will be short of 
between $100 billion and $150 billion in equity capital after the new Basel III global bank 
regulations are imposed, with 90 percent of the shortfall concentrated in the biggest six banks, 
according to Barclays Capital. The BarCap study assumes the banks will need to hold top quality 
capital equal to 8 percent of their total assets, adjusted for risk.”). 
 137. William R. Emmons, Vahe Lskavyan & Timothy J. Yeager, Basel II Will Trickle Down to 
Community Bankers, Consumers, THE REGIONAL ECON., Apr. 2005, at 12, available at 
http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=363 (“The New Basel Capital Accord, or 
Basel II, is scheduled for full implementation in 2008, and it will apply initially to only about 20 
of the largest U.S. banking organizations.”). 
 138. Id.  
 139. Leslé & Avramova, supra note 57, at 5–6 (depicting the capital ratio and the focus on 
RWAs). 
 140. N.M., Basel III: Third Time’s the Charm?, ECON. FREE EXCH. (Sept. 13, 2010, 5:57 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/09/basel_iii [hereinafter Third Time’s the 
Charm] (discussing that RWA, which remains in Basel III, is a major Basel II flaw). 
 141. BIS CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 38, at 18–21; BIS Press Release, supra note 
15, at 2–3.  
 142. BIS CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 38, at 2. (discussing how Tier 1 capital 
increases will be helpful during times of financial crisis).  
 143. Huw Jones, ANALYSIS – Implementation Key to Basel III Success, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 
2010), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2010/09/13/analysis-implementation 
-key-to-basel-iii-success (discussing how different asset classes are subject to various pressures to 
form bubbles in the market, which should be managed by using a case by case analysis based on 
the type of asset, the institution involved, and the country of operation). 
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numerator.144 Keeping risk weights in play through the AIRB approach can 
lead to problems when future risk is evaluated to see where a particular 
asset falls in the RWA scheme in comparison to how a bank decided to 
weight the asset. 
The tricky question to answer is: does the system create future asset 
bubbles that could lead to massive disruption across financial markets? This 
concern arises because of the competitive nature of the banking industry to 
remain profitable despite new regulations that are expensive and 
burdensome.145 Due to the globalization of the banking sector, asset bubbles 
are a growing cause for concern146 because of the competition across the 
banking sector to remain profitable and the vast array of financial products 
that are available to investors. 
The financial crisis was caused in part by an asset bubble in the 
marketplace that stemmed from an investment vehicle known as the 
mortgage backed security (MBS), which led to large profits for banks 
coupled with a shift in risk.147 The MBS crisis arose from the 
securitization148 of large pools of debt into collateralized investment 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Third Time’s the Charm, supra note 140 (keeping the RWA framework with the same risk 
weights is creating a similar scenario where banks will search for assets with less risk weight so 
that they do not have to put as much money aside if an asset underperforms).  
 145. Emmons et al., supra note 137, at 12.  
 146. See Third Time’s the Charm, supra note 140 (“Since it did not change this risk-weighting, 
Basel III effectively doubles down on Basel II. Banks will need to hold more common equity than 
ever against [sic] their risk-weighted assets. That massively increases the incentive to find low-
risk-weight assets with some return, since these assets can be leveraged much more highly than 
risky assets.”). 
 147. Mortgages/Mortgage-Backed Securities Definition, ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR BUS., 
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Mor-Off/Mortgages-Mortgage-Backed-Sec 
urities.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2010) (“MBSs shift risks related to changes in interest rates, 
prepayment and refinancing of mortgages, and default or nonpayment, and thus trends in these 
same areas affect the market for mortgage securities.”). 
 148.  
Securitization is the process of taking an illiquid asset, or group of assets, and through 
financial engineering, transforming them into a security.  
A typical example of securitization is a mortgage-backed security (MBS), which is a 
type of asset-backed security that is secured by a collection of mortgages. The process 
works as follows:  
First, a regulated and authorized financial institution originates numerous mortgages, 
which are secured by claims against the various properties the mortgagors purchase. 
Then, all of the individual mortgages are bundled together into a mortgage 
pool, which is held in trust as the collateral for an MBS. The MBS can be issued by a 
third-party financial company, such a large investment banking firm, or by the same 
bank that originated the mortgages in the first place. Mortgage-backed securities are 
also issued by aggregators such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.  
Regardless, the result is the same: a new security is created, backed up by the claims 
against the mortgagors’ assets. This security can be sold to participants in the secondary 
mortgage market. This market is extremely large, providing a significant amount of 
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vehicles that CRAs improperly gave a AAA. Thus, when assets are not 
properly risk weighted, dangerous bubbles in the market form because of 
the incentive to invest in the particular “riskless” asset.149 These assets will 
most likely have attractive yields to boost bank profitability.150 
One area of increased concern raised by Millman and others across the 
banking community is the nature of 0 percent risk-weight assets in 
particular sovereign debt.151 For example, “[b]onds issued by developing 
countries have outpaced U.S. equities, corporate debt and even many 
commodities in 2010 as investors looked for ways to tap into markets 
enjoying fast growth.”152 Under the current system, sovereign debt is part of 
the low risk liquidity requirements,153 with little money, if any, being set 
aside in case the underlying assets become worth less than evaluated. Thus, 
the choice of how to value assets becomes an exercise in how to find a way 
to put aside the least money and use the RWA scheme that works best for 
an institution.154 
This creates an incentive for banks to invest in this type of debt for 
several reasons. First, holding highly-rated assets without having to hold 
capital to cover losses suffered by the potential loss of these assets saves the 
bank money, allowing it to remain profitable.155 Second, banks looking for 
higher yields will be able to find them within emerging156 markets where 
debt is sold at a high rate with a low accompanying interest rate.157 Third, 
by shedding high risk investments, banks lower their RWA numbers and 
                                                                                                                 
liquidity to the group of mortgages, which otherwise would have been quite illiquid on 
their own.  
What is Securitization?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/07 
/securitization.asp#axzz1140YboVS.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
 149. Smith, supra note 28, at 3 (discussing how credit ratings agencies and internal risk 
modeling both missed the unforeseen risk in their ratings of assets); Cohan, supra note 109 
(describing how this occurred most recently with MBSs, where AAA ratings were given to over 
93 percent of MBS’s, which proved to be grossly incorrect).  
 150. Assis, supra note 119 (discussing the growing concern in high yield foreign debt offerings, 
which could be responsible for producing a bubble).  
 151. The Third Time’s the Charm, supra note 140. 
 152. Assis, supra note 119 (providing examples in China and Brazil).  
 153. Sovereign Debt and the Basle Rules – Clearing up the Confusion, SOBER LOOK, 
http://soberlook.com/2011/12/sovereign-debt-and-basle-rules-clearing.html (last visited Dec. 7, 
2011). 
 154. Leslé & Avramova, supra note 57, at 8 (“[B]anks converge toward the regulatory capital 
ratio that is the most favorable to them.”). 
 155. See The Third Time’s the Charm, supra note 140.  
 156. Emerging Market Definition, INVESTOR GLOSSARY, http://www.investorglossary.com 
/emerging-market.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) (“Emerging market, or emerging economy, is 
market with a relatively short and uncertain history of open market relations and foreign 
investment. . . . Depending on its nature and commitment to becoming a free-market economy, 
one emerging market may be different from another. Thus for example, after the collapse of a 
communist regime, Russia became a notable emerging market. . . . The stock markets of any given 
emerging market tend to be more volatile than more established markets.”). 
 157. See Assis, supra note 119.  
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consequently do not need to raise additional capital.158 Thus, the framework 
is doomed to fail due to the inverse relationship between the capital and 
RWA aspect of the capital ratios and will continue to encourage arbitrage159 
that undermines the goal of the requirements. 
III. IS BASEL III BLOWING THE BIGGEST BUBBLE YET? 
The Basel capital framework will be implemented slowly over the next 
seven years.160 Unfortunately, the higher capital ratio standards imposed by 
the new requirements will not remedy an inherent flaw in the system—
mainly, that the capital ratios will increase competitiveness among banks 
and lead to increased risk taking in uncharted assets to maintain record 
profits.161 Another concern revolves around the global sovereign debt 
crisis162 and the global bailout163 of banks over the past few years.164 
In order to understand the impact of the sovereign debt crisis, one must 
look only as far as news clippings from the start of the Eurozone debt crisis. 
In 2010, news outlets reported that Greece had debt equal to 115 percent of 
its GDP.165 This situation was further complicated by the Greek 
government’s lack of cooperation with the European Union166 in resolving 
their debt crisis.167 Although faced with economic turmoil, Greece issued 
government debt with 20 percent yields.168 Almost simultaneously, major 
concerns arose in Portugal and Spain surrounding their ability to meet debt 
obligations,169 while Italy became increasingly aware of its questionable 
economic health due to a nearly failed debt auction.170 
Next came the European Union bailouts. The Wall Street Journal 
reported that “[t]he European Union agreed on an audacious €750 billion 
($956 billion) bailout plan in an effort to stanch a burgeoning sovereign 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Bart, supra note 23; Interview by Renee Montagne, supra note 66.  
 159. See supra text accompanying note 7.  
 160. Banking Day Backgrounder, supra note 107.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Vincent Fernando, Europe’s Giant Bailout Fund Ignores The Root of the Debt Problem 
And Actually Makes Things Far Worse, BUS. INSIDER (May 10, 2010), http://www.businessinsider 
.com/europes-bailout-fund-ignores-moral-hazard-2010-5. 
 163. Stephen Glover, Would it be so Bad if the Euro Failed?, ONLINE MAIL (Nov. 23, 2010), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1332216/IRELAND-BAILOUT-Would-bad-euro 
-failed.html. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Europe’s Sovereign Debt Crisis: Acropolis Now, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2010, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/16009099 [hereinafter Acropolis Now]. 
 166. Id. (“[Greece] cannot grow out of trouble because of fiscal retrenchment and its lack of 
export prowess. It cannot devalue, because it is in the euro zone. And yet its people seem 
unwilling to endure the cuts in wages and services needed to make the economy competitive. In 
short, Greece looks bust.”).  
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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debt crisis that began in Greece but now threaten[ed] the stability of 
financial markets world-wide.”171 Investors celebrated the news, and the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average172 soared over 400 points.173 Although the 
EU was commended for its cooperative efforts to save the Euro,174 and for 
rescuing member nations with sovereign debt troubles,175 the long-term 
effect of the bailouts may encourage continued risky behavior around the 
world.176 For example, in November 2010, Ireland agreed to a government 
debt bailout of £70 billion,177 which was the first of probable government 
bailouts across Europe.178 
What do government bailouts and the Basel III risk-weight asset 
framework have in common? The overall theme of international 
cooperation across the banking sector encompassed in Basel III may be at 
the heart of the problem due to the political nature of the Basel 
negotiations,179 a thought discussed in Felix Salmon’s article, entitled 
Grading Basel III180:  
Basel III has been put in place by a group of 27 national governments. All 
of those governments have to borrow money. They want to ensure that 
their borrowing costs are as low as possible. And one very effective way 
of doing that is to ensure that government debt has a very low risk 
weighting, and that banks don’t need to hold much if any capital against 
it.181 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Stephen Fidler & Charles Forelle, World Races to Avert Crisis in Europe, WALL ST. J. 
(May 10, 2010, 5:50PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703880304575235 
632618569478.html.  
 172. Joshua Kennon, What is the Dow Jones Industrial Average, ABOUT.COM, http: 
//beginnersinvest.about.com/cs/newinvestors/f/whatisdowjones.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2012) 
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 174. See id.  
 175. See id.; see generally Acropolis Now, supra note 165 (discussing the sovereign debt 
troubles faced by Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy).  
 176. McGee, supra note 72 (discussing how Wall Street continues to make mistakes).  
 177. Glover, supra note 163. 
 178. Id. In 2011, Portugal received a $110 billion bailout from the European Union. Portugal’s 
78bn Euro Bail-Out is Formally Approved, BBC NEWS (May 16, 2011, 7:07 PM), 
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European Union to Give $170 Billion Bailout to Greece, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 20, 2012, 
11:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/20/greek-debt-crisis_n_1289242.html?view 
=print&comm_ref=false. 
 179. Felix Salmon, Grading Basel III, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2010), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix 
-salmon/2010/10/01/grading-basel-iii/. 
 180. Id. (discussing the shortcomings of Basel II that Basel III needed to address in order to be 
successful).  
 181. Id.  
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What is dangerous about an asset bubble forming in the asset category 
of sovereign debt? According to Millman, the topic of the risk-weight 
framework and the search to decrease the money that banks must hold 
against their assets was offered as a warning to the Basel III interaction with 
sovereign debt.182 Millman explains: 
Since it did not change this risk-weighting, Basel III effectively doubles 
down on Basel II. Banks will need to hold more common equity than 
ever—against their risk-weighted assets. That massively increases the 
incentive to find low-risk-weight assets with some return, since these 
assets can be leveraged much more highly than risky assets. Unless I’ve 
missed something, lending to AA-rated sovereigns still carries a risk-
weight of zero. So one result of Basel III could be to encourage banks to 
increase their lending to sovereigns at the margins of zero-risk-weight 
status. If that happens, anyone want to guess where the next crisis will 
crop up?183 
Thus, the self-interested governments that created this framework may 
have tilted the rules governing RWAs in their favor to allow banks to 
continue lending to troubled nations.184 In return, banks can put more of 
their money to work while the world is seemingly a safer place because of 
the bailout culture that has developed over the past ten years.185 Taxpayers 
are left to foot the bill as a result of poor investment decisions by various 
financial institutions.186 Changes to the framework are necessary to deter 
banks from prioritizing profits over shareholder and institutional safety. 
IV. THE SOLUTION: INCREASE RISK WEIGHTS FOR 
SOVEREIGN DEBT AND REVISIT THE STANDARDIZED 
APPROACH—THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ZERO-RISK  
Basel III would be more effective if risk weights assigned to sovereign 
debt were significantly increased by a disinterested self-regulatory 
organization. To ensure that banks do not have any reason to avoid the 
intended effects of the capital requirements, one might avoid the 
standardized and AIRB approaches for assigning risk weights altogether 
and instead opt for an outside, independent regulatory body to be 
constructed by the global community to monitor risk weight, and, in 
particular, assess the stability of government debt on a case-by-case basis. 
This self-regulatory organization should be charged with quarterly analysis 
of risk weights to facilitate a dynamic approach to managing risk. The 
board could respond to asset bubbles by reviewing bank capital to achieve a 
                                                                                                                 
 182. The Third Time’s the Charm, supra note 140.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id.  
 185. David Weldner, The Bailout Culture Turns 10, MARKETWATCH, http://articles 
.marketwatch.com/2008-09-11/news/30745643_1_bailout-ltcm-john-meriwether (Sept. 11, 2008). 
 186. Id. 
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dynamic approach to heightening risk weights. If, for example, risk weights 
increase enough for the sovereign debt asset class, banks will have less 
incentive to squeeze out profits by overinvesting in zero-risk assets that 
could overexpose the global community to an asset bubble.187 The efforts 
on the part of the regulators should be to identify asset classes that have 
become or may become bubbles that could damage the global economy. It 
is important that within this regime, there be both intelligent investments in 
government debt as well as protection against shortcuts to meet capital 
requirements. In hindsight, both the CRAs and the banks themselves were 
involved in gross miscalculations that led to a world financial crisis.188 In 
the spirit of global cooperation, why not remove the credit ratings and the 
AIRB approach from such a central role in the process, and instead, create a 
neutral supervisory board that will take account of credit ratings and 
internal bank ratings while completing an independent assessment of the 
accuracy of these ratings?  
There are benefits and detriments to improving the standardized 
approach and to maintaining the AIRB approach. This note argues that 
because of the complexity and lack of transparency of the AIRB 
approach,189 revisiting the standardized approach will be an easier and more 
efficient method of addressing issues of credibility that are currently 
hampering Basel III from being a true tool for change. 
The modified standardized approach could influence banks in the Basel 
framework. If the AIRB approach is going to be effective moving forward, 
greater transparency is needed to ensure that there are not gross deviations 
from the RWA percentages assigned under the modified standardized 
approach. It is unlikely that a bank would agree to share their methodology 
for RWA measurements, as this is an aspect of the competitive advantage 
over other institutions. Instead, penalties should be levied against banks to 
deter them from skewing RWA calculations in such a way that leads to 
losses.  
The modified standardized approach could potentially influence banks 
in a jurisdiction that still uses the AIRB approach. A bank that deviates 
from the modified standardized approach by an agreed upon value would 
not have the same access to bailout money that was previously afforded 
with generosity across the banking sector in the United States and Europe. 
Under this new framework, member nations would have to agree to the 
fundamental principle that no asset could receive a rating close to a 0 
percent risk weight, placing an emphasis on intelligent asset purchases over 
money-saving shortcuts.  
Furthermore, member nations to Basel would have to decide on a self-
regulatory organization to provide the RWA percentages. Interested parties, 
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 189. Leslé & Avramova, supra note 57, at 34–35. 
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such as CRAs, must be removed from the process to allow for this modified 
standardized approach to gain a foothold in the banking industry. As we just 
saw in the United States, a AAA country came close to default because of a 
political dispute. The default would have had nothing to do with the near-
term financial health of the United States, but is just one example of a need 
to periodically revise the risk associated with varying assets by a 
disinterested third party. The advisory board would protect investors and 
limit the likelihood of failed banking institutions. Banks and CRAs could 
still be involved in the process through comment and review of revised 
capital proposals. 
Lastly, to address the concern that AIRB method is better for the 
banking community, the regulators need to recruit talent to assess risk 
weights on an asset-by-asset basis. Building up a modified standardized 
approach to influence banks who continue to use the AIRB approach will 
be aided by establishing credibility that CRAs lost in the financial crisis. 
This concept will address the idea that the modified standardized approach 
is “throwing the baby out with the bath water”—it will increase efforts to 
have a dynamic review process of the value and relative risk of assets, and 
it will improve the assessment of banks and their risks to the financial 
system as a result of their asset positions. 
CONCLUSION 
Is Basel III the alternate reality that we would travel back in time to 
create? The rules were released by the BIS on December 17, 2010, and have 
been met with concern around the globe. Increased capital requirements are 
a logical step in the right direction, but the world should stay alert to the 
choices that banking leaders make today that will most certainly alter 
tomorrow. The next asset bubble could be forming right now due to the 
Basel III capital/RWA ratio framework. 
In the end, Basel III appears to be more of a Basel II with a few extra 
ingredients added in, and will make banks hold more capital while allowing 
leeway in their calculations of RWAs to avoid the intended effects of 
making the system safer. Although the AIRB approach was kept in Basel III 
and CRAs are still being reevaluated, the Basel Committee plans on 
revisiting the prescribed risk multiples assigned to asset classes. This means 
the RWA structure will be altered by assigning new percentages to various 
asset classes in order to instruct the banks on how much money they must 
hold in order to ensure their assets are backed by an appropriate amount of 
money relative to the risk assigned to that asset. The significance of the 
changes made to RWAs in the sovereign debt asset class is yet to be seen. If 
Basel III hopes to be effective, significant increases in RWAs will be 
needed to avoid asset bubbles. A greater degree of independence among 
those who decide on how the system operates is also an area that Basel III 
should embrace through the use of a modified standardized approach to 
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assigning RWAs. The analysis will involve the interplay of Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform Act and Basel III in an effort to create a safer banking 
sector. 
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